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They, who brought to birth the [South African] TRC process also ought to be 
commended for their wisdom… . we have seen how unsuccessful prosecutions 
can lead to bitterness and frustration in the community. Amnesty applicants 
often confessed to more gruesome crimes than were the subject of [a crimi-
nal]…trial, yet their assumptions of responsibility, and the sense that at least 
people were getting some measure of truth from the process, resulted in much 
less anger. For the sake of our stability, it is fortunate that the kind of details 
exposed by the Commission did not come out in a series of criminal trials, 
which—because of the difficulty of proving cases beyond reasonable doubt in 
the absence of witnesses other than co-conspirators—most likely, would have 
ended in acquittals.
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, “Forward,” 
Final Report, Volume 6 (2003), Truth at the Crossroads.
Wasn’t the TRC supposed to have obtained ‘the truth’ from perpetrators? 
Weren’t families supposed to have gained full information from perpetrators 
as a trade-off for giving up their rights to litigation and prosecution? And 
weren’t we all, as a nation, supposed to have reached closure and moved on 
from these horrors? That was the theory.
Carmel Rickard, The Sunday Times, South Africa, May 22, 2005.
1
Bildhaan  Vol. 7
2
I. Introduction
At the more macro and general level, this article is concerned with 
societal transition towards the rule of law and sustainable democracy 
in post-conflict societies. It departs from an understanding that suffi-
cient institutional capacity, in particular that needed to root and imple-
ment the rule of law, is ultimately required if secure, peaceful, and 
democratically viable post-conflict-ridden society is to be built and 
maintained over time. It assumes, in other words, that a legitimate 
and functioning normative order and a culture predisposed to such an 
order are key to security, reconciliation, and sustainable democracy.2 
More particularly, the article engages the time and the methods, as well 
as the concerns of transition from societal violence, authoritarianism, 
and tyranny, towards the rule of law and secure democracy. To use 
Jon Elster’s words, it deals with “the time” of attempting “to close the 
books” after a cessation of conflict has been agreed to and democracy 
is introduced.3
Since the end of the Cold War, demands and cries for an end to 
authoritarian government and tyranny, societal conflict, and injustice, 
and for peace and security, for reconciliation, and for a better life for 
all have increasingly been globally framed in a new paradigm, one of 
human rights and humanitarian law. Arguably, world peace and calls for 
the end to war, authoritarian government, and terrorism have come 
to be understood via debate that stresses the strengthening of socio-
political and socioeconomic institutional centers by way of expanded 
inclusion and extension, the rule of law, and an unfettered market, but 
also by a set of policies guaranteeing a rights culture. This suggests that 
the development and reconstruction struggles of recently democratic 
societies or regions are no longer strategically driven by international 
policy emanating from notions of control, conquest, and victory in 
a Superpower-driven binary world. Instead, they are motivated by 
global human rights and humanitarian concerns. The bringing together 
and reconciliation of people—and hence the securing of their human 
rights—has become central to conflict resolution and peace-building 
projects all around the world.
The contestation of the notion of transitional justice has become 
pivotal in this regard. On the one hand, there is the argument for the 
development, extension, and implementation of a universal code of 
criminal law and justice in order to close the books on impunity and to 
promote democracy via the rule of law. On the other are the calls for 
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an end to what is regarded by its proponents as essentially retributive 
justice in favor of reconciliation via truth telling and restorative justice 
(or forward-looking justice) through truth commissioning.4 In the one 
view, perpetrators and wrongdoers should be brought to justice in 
terms of identical standards of criminal law, no matter where they find 
themselves.5 The other view is situated within broad parameters that 
suggest that retributive justice is both doomed to failure and impracti-
cal in the struggle for a better life for all. It asserts that the implementa-
tion of transitional justice should be composed of some form of truth 
commissioning (or forward-looking justice) rooted in compromise 
and negotiated settlement, in which forgiveness and reconciliation, 
people-centeredness, and truth telling are keys to successful societal 
transition. These ideal-type strategic options make up the two poles 
on a continuum that also allows for a range of in-between or hybrid 
positions. The latter includes one in which internationalized domestic 
tribunals as well as truth commissions are set up with the cooperation 
of the United Nations. The two are meant to run alongside one another 
and function in tandem. This kind of strategy is currently being used 
in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Burundi (but not without practical 
difficulties).
At the institutional level transitional justice—in the form of the 
promotion of societal reconciliation, national unity, security, the rule 
of law, and democracy via truth commissioning of some sort—has 
become the key strategy used to challenge the universal or interna-
tional criminal justice system position and practice of a kind first set 
up after the Second World War at Nuremberg. In this sense, it may be 
suggested that the debates about a global rights paradigm underpins a 
shift in dominant ideology since the end of the Cold War. Arguably, the 
latter has brought into clearer focus than ever before the position that 
conquest and victory alone are too hollow a basis on which to build a 
lasting democratic peace in broken and conflicted societies and states, 
perhaps especially in those characterized by deep ethnic and/or racial 
cleavages. In other words, the lack or tempering of victor ideology as a 
facilitating value holds much promise as a forward-looking strategy 
in the search for peace. The article attempts to do three things: (1) pro-
vide discussion of the notions of the rule of law, institution building, 
reconciliation, security, and peace building towards democracy in the 
framework of what is known as transitional justice in the literature; 
(2) briefly discuss and comment on some of the elements of the South 
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African case6 in this light; and (3) open up a discussion on Somalia in 
the aforementioned context.
II. Reconciliation
There is little agreement in the growing academic literature as to pre-
cisely what reconciliation in the context of truth commissioning means, 
how to measure it, or how to promote it. The detail of these debates is 
not central to this article. Rather, some general themes that run through 
them will serve to frame the discussion.7 Four issues are raised.
In the first place, it needs to be stressed that reconciliation is not 
an event that can be legislated or governed by a law. For example, 
the extent to which the South African Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission (SATRC) managed to bring about reconciliation (or national 
unity) is very limited, notwithstanding a pervasive, almost exclusively 
international perception of a miracle-like success in South Africa. This 
kind of myth is troubling insofar as it creates greatly overburdened 
expectations with regard to what truth commissions can bring about 
in short periods of time. In practice and over time such a myth under-
mines rather than builds legitimate security and sustainable democ-
racy. It is, therefore, especially destructive and serves to take away 
from the kinds of very important advantages truth commissioning can 
bring. Archbishop Tutu and the Commission members were, in fact, 
and quite soon into the life of SATRC, forced to address the hitherto 
glorified question of reconciliation. Victims and deponents did not 
understand what it was supposed to be. Questions such as with whom 
should we reconcile were not uncommon from those who came to tell 
their stories or the stories of their loved ones to the Human Rights Vio-
lations Committee (HRV)8 of the Commission.
This question was directly linked to the very deeply entrenched 
apartheid racial cleavages in South Africa. Overall, very few white 
South Africans attended the HRV public hearings and it is in this con-
text that the question arose, both at the hearings and in discussions 
held afterwards. In consequence, the much more sensible goal of pro-
moting and facilitating reconciliation was adopted, at least within the 
discussions going on inside of the Commission. However, it must be 
noted that very little headway was made in changing the expectations 
in the public domain during the life of the Commission around the 
notion of reconciliation. The question of reconciliation remains a point 
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of severe criticism among South Africans overall with regard to their 
understanding of the work and promises of the SATRC.
Secondly, the spirit that underpins any conceptualization or the-
ory of reconciliation attempts to capture and communicate the idea of 
the bringing together of divergent and opposing views and opinions. 
It incorporates the (re)uniting of people, of groups, or of society in 
harmony. This is to be understood, minimally, as tolerance and the 
forbearance of differences and divergences at the individual as well 
as the collective and national levels. It means the acceptance that in 
democratic society it is legitimate and even important to disagree—but 
not to attempt to overthrow, by means of violence or anarchy, the 
societal order when there is divergence and opposition among people 
or groups. In this sense, reconciliation and democracy suggest a set 
of rules or a legitimate societal “patterning” in which all (or the great 
majority) of the players agree that such rules are in their common 
interest and must therefore be abided by.
An overall distinction is made between two forms of reconcilia-
tion; that is, between individual reconciliation and national, societal, 
or so-called political reconciliation.9 This is the third matter that needs 
attention. At one level, the former is both infinitely difficult and com-
plex as well as more probable within the context of an institution like 
a truth commission. On the other hand, and as Sarkin has persuasively 
argued, these magic moments of individual reconciliation in the life of 
the South African Commission were few and far between.10 They have, 
however, become powerfully symbolic on both the national and inter-
national stages.
Such magic moments in South Africa include the willingness of Dawie 
Ackerman, husband of one of the people killed in the St James’ Church 
Massacre in July of 1992, to forgive three of his wife’s jailed killers after 
each had apologized to him at their amnesty hearing. The church was 
attacked by a group of black men affiliated with the Pan African Con-
gress of South Africa. It was situated in what was then a whites-only 
suburb of Cape Town and Mrs. Ackerman was white.
The second category of collective or societal reconciliation is the 
long-term, intricate process of a post-conflict and newly democratic 
society closing and settling its books, in Jon Elster’s terms. Or, as Sar-
kin says of a national reconciliation project:
Reconciliation in a nation after conflict has to be a long-term goal. It 
requires deliberate, measured programmes and processes, including 
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measures such as conflict resolution and social rehabilitation. For recon-
ciliation to occur, time is needed. It is not something that happens over-
night. Reconciliation is dependent on a host of other variables, which all 
need to be assessed and examined collectively.11 (My emphasis)
Finally, and in response to the difficult dilemmas of how to recog-
nize and measure reconciliation, the question of the understanding of 
the past, more particularly the conflicts of the past, needs to be raised. 
Two very pressing questions immediately come to mind: whose under-
standing and whose history are at issue? Clearly, to the extent that 
there is a common understanding of the conflicts of the past, it will 
greatly increase the chances of promoting reconciliation in a post-con-
flict and newly democratic society. Yet as has already been suggested, 
this is precisely where the problem lies. Societies in conflict are deeply 
divided entities. Building national reconciliation must open a debate 
and a dialogue between the competing and hitherto incommensurate 
views of the various factions towards a unifying grasp of the conflicts 
of the past. Ariel Dorfmann, the well-known Chilean human rights 
activist and author of Death and the Maiden, held a discussion in the 
Johannesburg offices of the SATRC during his visit to South Africa in 
1996. In response to a question, he argued that the success and sustain-
ability of peace may ultimately lie in finding the “middlepoint” of the 
competing versions of what in fact happened in the past.12 The more 
people share such a “middlepoint” and the less they clot around the 
extremes of the continuum of understanding (and hence divergence), 
the better the chances to promote a meaningful reconciliation and a 
secure and sustainable democracy.
There are at least two very different views of South African history 
and the conflicts of the past in the minds of the majority of ordinary 
South Africans: a white or erstwhile ruling group’s viewpoint, and that 
of the previously disenfranchised black majority. While very few white 
South Africans will publicly argue that apartheid was morally right in 
principle or even defensible in the wake of the SATRC (to their credit), 
this formal acknowledgment should not be taken at face value. Sur-
veys and public opinion as reflected and reported in the mass media in 
South Africa has produced little persuasive scientific evidence to sug-
gest that the majority of whites view the history of the conflict of the 
past differently now than before the publication of the Commission’s 
final reports. In terms of this understanding, it is not possible to argue 
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that real national reconciliation has taken place in South Africa thus 
far.
When we consider the Somali case an enormous amount of disso-
nance arises immediately. Not only do some Somalis wish to secede 
(the Somaliland option), Somalis overall have become a very deeply 
divided people. The history of the conflicts of the past has been rewrit-
ten in the people’s memory and hence in their actions over the past 
three decades or so. This was promoted and facilitated by the divide-
and-rule strategies used by Siyaad Barre and then via the power hun-
gry and acquisitive actions of a cluster of individuals who became 
warlords, and who appropriated the notion of kinship and reified it as 
a force in itself, and in so doing destroyed the Somali state. In Somalia, 
kinship has now become clanism and even sub-clanism—a force for 
itself. Until Somalis recognize that they have a history of significant 
commonality instead of clinging to the primal forces of clanism as their 
main identity marker, their chances of reconciliation and peace build-
ing toward the rule of law and democracy will sadly remain dubious. 
The understanding of the past needs to be thoroughly debated. The 
notion of clanism as the dominant prism through which the Somali 
conflict is viewed needs to be revised in the light thereof. Notwith-
standing the recent rise to power of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), 
significant stumbling blocks to reconciliation and security under 
the guise of clanism remain intact. Even the UIC was organization-
ally structured through an alliance of established groups, each held 
together by autonomous clan-specific courts. The Ethiopian military 
sanctioned, but highly fragile, victory of the Transitional Federal Gov-
ernment is no less grounded in a tribalist dispensation. The existence 
of the clanist mentality can only serve to further exacerbate attempts 
to unite people in harmony through their common membership in the 
Islamic religion, their historically shared ancestry and geography, and 
their implicit national interests.
III. Security
Security is a central condition for action. The basic sense in which we must 
understand the order of ‘the social order’ is one of pattern and regularity afford-
ing the confidence of being able to function, to go on, to get by, to make sense of 
our particular segments of activity. While material conditions critically affect 
ontological, as well as any more conventionally conceived, security, they only do 
Bildhaan  Vol. 7
8
so informed by the cognitive dimension of structure—the pattern of meaning or 
mutual knowledge in relation to which we feel secure or insecure.13
Security is considered to be a highly contested concept. Yet, it is almost 
instinctively understood by all at the ontological level to, at the very 
least, refer to survival as the most basic value to be secured or pro-
tected. Without survival, no other values have any meaning. We do 
not deal here with the vast literature on security or the changes to the 
concept in the post-Cold War era. Suffice it to note that the Cold War 
military-political definition of security, which privileged the state, has 
been broadened considerably, allowing for the development of the 
idea of “human security”—a definition that places people at the center 
of security, but also allows for the state as a referent object. Security, 
as Buzan defined it in his seminal work, means “freedom from fear.”14 
It is the condition of not feeling threatened, and the process, accord-
ing to McSweeney, through which resources are organized to remedy 
vulnerabilities.15 The state is instrumental in providing and building 
security. At the national level (so-called military-political security), the 
state protects its sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the domestic 
level (so-called societal security), it is supposed to protect economic 
and individual security. Domestic or internal security has as its main 
agents or instruments of security the internal security forces of the 
state, such as the police, intelligence services, and the legal system. The 
rule of law is the ultimate guarantor against possible state abuse of its 
security powers.
In the case of state failure to provide security, citizens turn else-
where. The affluent buy it in the marketplace (privatized security). 
The poor go without, or turn to self-help, vigilante groups, or mob 
justice, thereby making it hugely difficult for the state to reclaim its 
monopoly over organized violence and its ability to create and main-
tain social order and to grow strong institutions and a culture of the 
rule of law. Post-apartheid South Africa provides a good example of 
this struggle.16 Somalia will face similar challenges in reasserting the 
state as not only a referent object of security, but also as a provider of 
security. During their brief rise, the UIC managed to create a sense of 
stability and order, not least due to their success in meting out justice. 
Now that they have been eclipsed, their incorporation into the state 
as part of its institutional structure and/or the extent to which their 
success can be reproduced—will depend on the nature of the reconcili-
ation that will be reached, including the extent to which international 
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actors involved in a Somali peace process will support a continuing 
role for these Courts. It is to the nature and role of foreign involvement 
that we now turn.
States aim to reproduce their own survival, often (perceived to be) 
threatened by external agents or, especially in the case of developing 
and/or deeply divided countries, by internal forces. In the case of a 
state being threatened by internal forces, external intervention is not 
unknown, whether in order to aid the state (as was the case with the 
support to the regime of Kabila Senior in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo in the early 2000s by Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia) or to 
aid rebel groups (as was the case with support to the Lord’s Resistance 
Army in northern Uganda by the government of Sudan). The neat 
distinction between internal security and national security proves to 
be merely academic in the case of Somalia. Ethiopian military inter-
vention seriously bedevils chances of solving (let alone legitimating) 
the protracted split in the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). 
The broader international community’s support for the Jowhar group 
undermined the efforts of (at least some in) the Mogadishu group to 
demobilize their militias (initially successful and resulting in largely 
improved security conditions in the capital). The Mogadishu warlords 
felt threatened by the power and success of the various Islamic Courts 
in bringing stability and a measure of security to the inhabitants of the 
city. They formed an alliance, which then declared outright war against 
the Islamic Courts, claiming that the Courts had terrorist connections. 
They also succeeded in gaining the support of the United States. The 
U.S.-backed alliance saw uprisings in Mogadishu, further hampering 
efforts at creating stability and security. In short, the nature of foreign 
intervention, especially in the peace process in Somalia, continues to 
undermine attempts to create national and domestic security, worsen-
ing conditions in the country, rather than contributing to the processes 
of reconciliation and security building.
Yet one also needs to look at the present Somali situation against the 
background of the South African experience. A number of aspects of 
the context with which truth and reconciliation were pursued in South 
Africa should be mentioned:
•  The truth and reconciliation process started after the transition pro-
cess in the country had been well under way: negotiations took place 
between 1990 and early 1994 with an interim constitution adopted 
in 1993, democratic elections based on universal franchise followed 
in April 1994, and the SATRC was set up in December 1995.
Bildhaan  Vol. 7
10
•  Internal security had been stabilised: the negotiations of 1990 to 
early 1994 were predicated on the principle that all parties agreed to 
renounce violence.17
•  The restructuring of the security forces was also already in full 
swing by the time the SATRC started its operations. Investigators 
were drawn from the ‘old’ forces, the ‘new’ forces, and the former 
liberation movements, making this an inclusive process and con-
tributing to a perception that (a) there was unity within the security 
establishment and (b) that all aspects of the country’s past would be 
investigated, no matter within which sector/group of society abuses 
had taken place.
•  Aspects of the rule of law as well as the spirit thereof had existed 
throughout the era of apartheid in South Africa. The legal system 
claimed to be committed to it. It was readopted during the negotia-
tions and had been established, functioning and generally respected, 
with the interim constitution providing both symbolic and practical 
guidelines for the conduct of the security apparatus.
•  Throughout the process of negotiation (prior to the most visible act 
of transition—the 1994 national elections), the international com-
munity played a positive and supportive role, putting pressure 
on parties and leaders when the ‘going got tough,’ but ultimately 
respecting the right of the negotiating parties, and, by implication, 
the people of South Africa, to decide the terms of their agreement.
In other words, to the extent that one can view the truth and rec-
onciliation process in South Africa as successful, it would seem that 
the establishment of the rule of law, the agreement to negotiate on the 
basis of a renouncement of violence, the general stability of the secu-
rity situation, a measure of integration among various security forces 
(whether official, paramilitary, or militias), and positive reinforcement 
of these processes by the international community were crucial to the 
success of attempts at reconciliation.
As far as international involvement in Somalia is concerned, one 
salient difference between South Africa at the start of its negotiation 
process in 1990 and that of present day Somalia should be noted. South 
Africa negotiated a peaceful settlement in the wake of (and to some 
extent because of) the end of the Cold War. Somalia is attempting to 
negotiate a settlement at the height of a new international war, the 
“War against Terror,” which has polarized the world anew along ideo-
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logical lines. In 1990, the Superpowers, major powers, and regional 
states in southern Africa were all willing to work together and to sup-
port and respect the outcome of South Africa’s negotiations. Today 
there are deep international cleavages that impact the way in which 
the international community perceives and intervenes in Somalia. The 
war against terror now pits the U.S. against the UIC and its legacy and, 
it would seem, therefore against a large segment of Somalia’s citizenry, 
thereby inhibiting attempts to end the violence, stabilize the security 
situation, embark on security sector reform, and negotiate an inclusive 
settlement for the country.
IV. Transitional Justice
Transitional justice refers to formal and informal procedures implemented by a 
group or institution of accepted legitimacy around the time of a transition out 
of an oppressive or violent social order, for rendering justice to perpetrators and 
their collaborators, as well as to their victims.18
Teitel defines transitional justice as, “the conception of justice associ-
ated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses 
to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.”19 As 
has been suggested, the idea of transitional justice is a matter of some 
moral, socio-political, and legal controversy. The brief discussion that 
follows looks at the important problems and insights it brings to the 
discussions around societal transition. We discuss some lessons from 
the past and the history of the concept by looking at some of Jon 
Elster’s work. We address the question as to whether or not transitional 
justice is needed at all in the wake of an agreement to end violence and 
tyranny in order to build a secure democracy. Finally, there is a short 
commentary on the relationship between truth and justice.
A. Lessons from the Past: The Forces of History
In what is surely a defining work on the history of transitional justice, 
Jon Elster’s Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective 
raises questions and analytical arguments around the empirical con-
duct of transitional justice from a historical angle.20 By making use of 
richly textured arguments and by refreshingly avoiding the somewhat 
jargonized and “politically correct” language common to much of the 
contemporary debate in the field, he states the purpose of his book: 
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“I mainly try to describe and explain variations in how societies close 
their open accounts from the past after regime transitions.”21
More particularly, this book is concerned with debunking false 
conceptions. Through research and the development of appropriate 
analytical frameworks, Elster shows that the application of transi-
tional justice is by no means a new or exceptional 20th-century or 
post-Second World War method of attempting to close the books after 
an authoritarian or tyrannical regime falls, societal violence is ended, 
and democracy is introduced. By systematically engaging the ques-
tions of how the victims and perpetrators of societal conflict have been 
dealt with over time and of how reconciliation was promoted (or not), 
Elster suggests that societies can grow by learning from the past. He 
looks at both “backward-looking” issues, or how societies respond to 
wrongdoing and suffering, as well as “forward-looking” issues such 
as economic reconstruction and Constitution making in as far as they 
interact with the former.22 What follows is a short (but hopefully not a 
reductionist) summary of his discussion of the overthrow of Athenian 
democracy in the 5th-century B.C. In the quest to appreciate how best 
to understand and promote reconciliation and sustainable democracy, 
and to learn what not to do, lessons from the past must always be the 
starting point, else we are surely doomed merely to repeat history ad 
infinitum.
Elster begins by looking at early Athenian democracy. One may jus-
tifiably enquire as to why Africans should be interested in events that 
occurred almost 2,500 years ago in Europe. What, if anything, could 
Somali society learn from these long past events that were situated in 
another continent and a radically different context? The Greek city-
states were the home of democracy as we know it today. The beginning 
of Athenian democracy is to be found around 594 B.C., when Solon 
was asked to reform the city-state laws. Broadly speaking, democracy 
meant the direct rule of the citizens (the demos) as opposed to the rule 
of tyrants. Because the question of democracy remains at the center of 
the search for international peace, security, and human dignity for all 
at the start of the 21st century, and because Somalia has been ruled by 
tyrants over these past three decades, the struggles of early Athenian 
democracy resonate strongly.
In light of this article’s aims, no attempt will be made to enter into 
the detailed arguments offered by Elster in support of his compelling 
analysis in the field of aggravated socio-historical contestation. Suffice 
it to note that Athenian democracy was overthrown early in its life on 
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two occasions and was re-established both times. Furthermore, Greek 
democracy survives today, notwithstanding a 2,500-year history that 
included periods of non-democratic, tyrannical, and totalitarian rule. 
For example, Greece was ruled by the Ottomans and was part of their 
Empire for close to 400 years, gaining independence from them in 1832. 
Its last experiment with totalitarian rule was the military junta that was 
overthrown in 1974. Viewed from this perspective, the surviving Greek 
democracy is an encouraging lesson to us all.
Secondly, in doing an analysis of these “two episodes…that fol-
lowed closely upon each other in Athens during the 5th century B.C.,” 
Elster finds that “transitional justice is almost as old as democracy 
itself.”23 Athenian democracy was overthrown in 411 B.C. and then 
again in 404–403 B.C. by oligarchs.24 After the breakdown of the first 
oligarchy, reinstated Athenian democrats carried out severe retribution 
(executions) and introduced laws to deter similar events from reoccur-
ring. After the second, the pre-oligarchic democrats introduced a range 
of constitutional changes attempting to deal with the origin of, and 
reasons for, the problems that led to the overthrow of their democracy 
initially. They enacted what Elster refers to as a “forward-looking” 
goal this time, one meant to promote reconciliation. Extensive amnesty 
from prosecution and the option of exile to those not covered by the 
amnesty were offered to members and supporters of the oligarchy 
this time. Much less retribution took place. Clearly the democrats had 
learned from their first experience and wanted to avoid reoccurring 
violence and challenges to their state. As to the reasons for this rela-
tively temperate exercise of retribution, Elster offers three possibilities. 
They are remarkably familiar to any observer of history and of contem-
porary events dealing with societal transition away from conflict and 
authoritarianism. They leave one with the feeling that little seems to 
have really changed over 2,500 years.25 Elster suggests that one reason 
for the reconciliatory actions could have been “imposed by Sparta” 
(e.g., the international community). A second potential reason is that 
the action could have come about as “a condition stipulated by the 
oligarchs in exchange for giving up power” (e.g., Pinochet in Chile). 
Finally, the restraint used, which in this view is conciliatory, could 
have resulted from being “freely chosen by the Athenian democrats” 
(e.g., Spain after Franco in 1976).26 In concluding his analysis of the 
overthrow of the Athenian democracy and its lessons, Elster suggests 
that the reasoning behind this action in 404 B.C. may have contained all 
of the above elements and that this played a role in promoting peace 
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and sustaining democracy. Furthermore, by drawing on this very early 
example at the inception of Western democracy, Elster is able to iden-
tify what he refers to as the “cast of characters in transitional justice: 
wrongdoers (perpetrators), victims, resisters, neutrals, and beneficia-
ries from wrongdoing.”27
Can Elster’s analysis of the development and conduct of transitional 
justice help us grapple with the enormous challenges of the Somali 
conflict and the attempts being made to establish a democratic state? 
What can we learn from it? The existing Greek democracy provides 
not only an example of the persistence of the ideals of democracy 
over time, but also evidence of its imprint on the social order. In other 
words, once established, democratic culture tends to be preserved 
in societal memory. Ahmed I. Samatar argues persuasively that, for 
example, such a key democratic moment stands out in Somali history 
particularly over the period 1964–1967, under the leadership of Presi-
dent Aden A. Osman and Premier Abdirazak H. Hussein.28 There is, in 
the era of the postcolonial state, a history of the people ruling Somalia.29 
Samatar also argues that the era of the pre-colonial order included “a 
cultural pattern, informed by a sense of the divine, which portrayed a 
moral code and common sense; and a loose political practice marked 
by local legitimacy and accountability.” What has happened to these 
memories and this culture? Can they be mobilized as a forward-look-
ing act toward building reconciliation and sustainable democracy? Are 
there examples of reconciliatory actions in Somali history that can be 
drawn upon? Has amnesty been granted after periods of conflict or 
have the actions of post-conflict regimes and governments in Somalia 
always implemented retributive justice? In other words, what has the 
history of one or another form of transitional justice been?
We would answer affirmatively the question of whether Somalis 
(as we all) can learn from Elster’s exposition of Athenian democracy’s 
conduct of transitional justice. The perspective of time and place brings 
with it a promise that ultimately facilitates and motivates action.
B. Do We Need Transitional Justice at All?
Why should there be transitional justice when there is a new demo-
cratic regime? This is the first question that needs attention, accord-
ing to Elster.30 In other words, why should the wrongdoings of past 
authoritarian regimes be addressed or unpacked at all in the face of a 
brand new democracy that has been agreed upon by the relevant par-
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ties? How strong is the demand for justice in the wake of negotiations 
that ultimately lead to agreements to enter into a democratic order? In 
the case of a civil war, are all or any of the participants in a position to 
demand justice? If so, what kind of transitional justice? Don’t demands 
for justice spoil or undercut the agreed-upon peace? These are some of 
the questions that need to be addressed before engaging in the peril-
ous processes of implementing any form of transitional justice, argues 
Elster.
When looking at Somalia in light of the above, a number of points 
need consideration. Somalis have been unable to agree satisfactorily 
with one another at a dozen or so different gatherings during the 
period since the fall of Barre’s regime. They are so deeply divided that 
they have not been able to reconcile sufficiently in order to resurrect the 
Somali state. Recently, there have been two powerful bodies vying for 
the right to recreate the state. Another group wants to secede (Somalil-
and). One, Puntland State, has declared itself an autonomous region. 
The TFG, with its particular history of division, and the UIC have 
been unable to agree to meet regularly or to strategize together. The 
upshot has been a full Ethiopian military invasion to install Colonel 
Abdullahi Yusuf’s TFG. Consequently, violent instability has returned 
to Mogadishu and other southern parts of the country. Still it is impor-
tant to note that there was no evidence that the warring factions in 
South Africa would enter into a formal four-year dialogue when F.W. 
De Klerk announced the “unbanning” of the South African liberation 
movements and freed Nelson Mandela from prison in 1990. No serious 
observers or scholars working on South Africa expected it to happen at 
the time.
In order to illustrate his point further, Elster goes on to argue, by 
looking at available evidence, that transitions to democracy have been 
made without opening up the past.31 We refer briefly to two of the 
examples he notes: the Spanish transition to democracy in 1976–78 after 
the death of General Franco (long-time dictator, following the bloody 
civil war that took place from 1936–1939) and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. According to Elster, the first rested on an internal consensus 
and the second resulted from the lack of any organized demand for 
either justice or truth. Neither of these two countries decided to offi-
cially confront their respective pasts by engaging questions of truth 
or justice or accountability. Transitional justice as a facilitator and pro-
moter of democracy was not incorporated into their respective pro-
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cesses of peace and nation building. This begs a range of questions, the 
most pressing being, why open up the past again?
In South Africa this question was often asked, both before and dur-
ing the life of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion, and not only by members of one of the main protagonists in the 
struggle. It was well known at the time that there were many senior 
African Nationalist Congress (ANC) members who felt that opening 
up the past further would lead to little or no good. Some believed 
that the racially driven socio-political and economic power divides 
(that were the raison d’être of the apartheid state) had been sufficiently 
bridged over the period of four years of formal negotiations (1990–
1994), and that the building of a new democratic South Africa should 
take precedence. “The page should be turned” and the “reopening of 
patients so soon after they had been operated on” was asking for trou-
ble and tribulation. These two metaphors became common coinage 
at the time. On the other hand, it was equally well known that some 
senior National Party (NP) members, as well as the majority of white 
Afrikaners, felt that a truth commission in South Africa was merely 
an excuse to formalize a witch hunt against them by the ANC. Any 
perusal of the Afrikaans language press over the period 1995 to 1998 
will show that commentators saw the Commission as an attempt by 
the ANC to put white Afrikaners on trial, even though it should have 
become clear very early that under the leadership of Desmond Tutu, 
their fears would remain hollow. Any reasonable reading of the South 
African Commission’s work shows unequivocally that one of its key 
findings was that individual members of all the main political forces in 
South Africa during the struggle had been guilty of gross human rights 
violations.32
C. Truth and Justice
As this article hopes to have shown, no simple or straightforward 
answers exist in response to the many questions about how to estab-
lish a lasting peace in the wake of conflict-ridden, authoritarian, and 
oppressive regimes. Neither are there uncontested or universally held 
positions determining how societies in periods of transition toward 
peace and democracy should deal with the crimes of the past or 
accountability for these crimes. The range of technical procedures that 
exist to close the books include the following: trials and tribunals; 
“amnesia”; negotiated restitution and compensation; amnesty; lustra-
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tion and purges; and justice via truth commissioning33 (or a combina-
tion of these).
Drawing on Elster’s useful distinction between backward- and for-
ward-looking transitional justice, the former would include trials and 
tribunals. The latter would encompass negotiated restitution and com-
pensation, amnesty, and truth commissioning. That would arguably 
leave amnesia, lustration, and purges somewhere between the two.
In the case of South Africa, forward-looking transitional justice strat-
egies were implemented. The perpetrators were facilitated (that is, the 
apartheid state and its agents) when backward-looking punitive or 
retributive legalistic “justice was put up for trade,” in Priscilla Hayner’s 
words.34 Truth commissioning as a process to promote reconciliation 
and national unity was selected. Individual freedom from prosecution, 
as well as amnesty, was offered to the perpetrators in exchange for the 
full truth about politically motivated crimes. Human Rights Viola-
tions Public Hearings inside of the Commission were set up to deal 
with “rectifying the damage to human dignity.”35 Hence, the South 
African Commission can rightly claim a degree of victim centeredness. 
Finally, a committee was set up to make recommendations to the State 
President with regard to the rehabilitation of, and reparations to, those 
found to have been victims of gross human rights violations by the 
apartheid state. It was argued that the truth told at the Commission 
was a form of justice that would promote reconciliation and hence a 
democratic society.
D. South African Truth Commissioning: Any Lessons for Somalia?
The South African Commission has become a model for all upcoming 
commissions. Any perusal of the ever-growing literature on questions 
of transitional justice makes the point forcefully. Moreover, there is 
seldom, if ever, a discussion in the international public domain dealing 
with conflict-ridden societies, authoritarian regimes, and the search for 
solutions that facilitate democracy that does not refer to the South Afri-
can case and its “small miracle.” In the introductory chapter to a vol-
ume dealing with truth commissions, Robert Rotberg claims that the 
South African commission has set the standard in this regard.36 Pris-
cilla Hayner makes much the same point.37 She notes that the “South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission succeeded in bringing 
this subject to the center of international attention, especially through 
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its public hearings of both victims and perpetrators outlining horrific 
details.”38
As has already been suggested, however, it is extremely important 
to remember that the kinds of expectations and promise captured by 
the somewhat over-idealized views of the South African commission 
need careful deliberation each time a truth commission is debated or 
set up. Whilst there is an enormous amount to learn from the South 
African case, it is crucial to keep in mind that any choice about tran-
sitional justice (and the institutional process that accompanies it) is 
always rooted in a particular context and a unique history. There are 
always parallels to be drawn and very important lessons to be learned 
from what has come before, but the attempt to replicate a model in the 
belief that the process that follows will bring the same outcome is a 
dangerous assumption. Similarities cannot be overgeneralized. Each 
case needs to be carefully reviewed so as to be cognizant of its empiri-
cal uniqueness. It should be kept in mind that truth commissions are 
not without problems, and that they are not quick and easy events to 
be organized, as we have suggested earlier on. As Priscilla Hayner has 
noted:
Truth commissions are virtually never smooth, pleasant, well-managed, 
well-funded, politically uncomplicated bodies. On the contrary, most 
struggle daily with a barrage of methodological, operational, and politi-
cal problems, and operate under extreme pressures of time, under the 
heavy moral and emotional weight of their task and the risk of damag-
ing error in their conclusion.39
The South African case is dissimilar from the Somali one in a range 
of important areas, the most glaring of which was the existence of a 
functioning South African state, albeit one that had been weakening 
over quite some time before 1990. The fact of its existence was the 
basis of the South African negotiated settlement and the creation of the 
SATRC. In Somalia there has not been a state or any functioning state 
institutions in existence since 1991, with the overthrow of Siyaad Barre. 
What does this mean for truth commissioning as the transitional justice 
choice in Somalia?
Bruce Baker argues, in an article dealing with the Mozambique case, 
“that democracy demands the rule of law as the guarantor of political 
and civil rights,” but that they (political and civil rights) are “ultimately 
worthless unless the rule of law is first made to prevail.”40 For him, the 
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sequencing of building democracy is very important. Put crudely, he 
argues for first the rule of law and then democracy. In institutional 
terms as well as in those of everyday culture, the rule of law survived 
the apartheid state. It had been implemented institutionally in a kind 
of warped and skewed fashion from 1948–1994. It was therefore pos-
sible for the negotiators of the South African democracy to draw on 
these institutions and the capacity they provided during the period of 
the negotiations. This, at the very least, helped legitimate the ideas of 
democracy and transitional justice.
A powerful—sometimes very tenuous and conflicted but neverthe-
less inclusive—process of elite negotiations and trade-offs toward tran-
sition and democracy took place over the four years in South Africa. 
The process throughout was able to draw on the capacity of function-
ing state institutions. Moreover, the practice and conduct of demo-
cratic principles were not unfamiliar to most sections of the South 
African population. For example, the broad liberation movement, 
under the auspices of the United Democratic Front, had since 1982 
not only facilitated the development of a network of democratic dia-
logue and open debate on the ground and in the public domain in 
South Africa, it had also been crucial in encouraging the creation of a 
very powerful and activist range of civil society organizations. Democ-
racy in decision making was a key goal of all these organizations. By 
1990, there were literally thousands of non-governmental and com-
munity-based organizations making use of legitimate laws in order to 
fight exploitation, inequality, and oppression in South African courts. 
A further example of democratic practice and culture existed among 
the whites-only citizens of South Africa. Those that negotiated and 
ultimately traded themselves out of power and into the South African 
democracy, namely, mainly white Afrikaners, had a strong legacy of 
internal democracy, rule of law, and democratic decision making. Afri-
kaner nationalism, it may be argued, had throughout its history been 
characterized by a strong republican spirit and democratic leadership 
processes. Hence, there existed a relatively free press and a relatively 
independent judiciary throughout the life of the apartheid state.
Sustainable democratic states are conditional upon the existence of 
functioning institutions. While the South African apartheid state was 
by no means strong or democratic in the conventional sense in 1990, at 
the start of the Kempton Park negotiations—or in December 1995, at 
the setting up of the SATRC—it was nonetheless possible to draw on 
its capacity and begin to rebuild and reform its still functioning institu-
Bildhaan  Vol. 7
20
tions, especially those underpinning the rule of law. The lack of a func-
tioning state makes matters considerably more complex and difficult in 
the Somali case. In other words, the Somali case requires the parties to 
pay serious attention to how such institutional gaps will influence the 
choices that need to be made about transitional justice mechanisms, 
such as truth commissioning, in order to make a worthwhile and posi-
tive contribution to reconciliation, security, and democracy.
E. Background Notes to South Africa’s Post-Colonial Past
Faced with strategic choices around the issues of accountability and 
justice, the negotiators in South Africa were required to debate and 
trade to find a suitable method of transitional justice. This was for-
mally prompted by the apartheid government’s demand for a general 
amnesty for, minimally, the security forces and politicians.
The origins of the South African racial order can be traced back 
most fruitfully to mid-18th-century society in the Cape.41 By the turn 
of the 20th century, privilege and power had come to be identified 
with those who were white, while political exclusion and poverty had 
increasingly become the destiny of those who were black. In this sense, 
South Africa’s history is much like that of many colonies in that race 
and class converged over time and brought untold hardships to the 
original inhabitants of the various colonial territories of the world. The 
apartheid state was set up in 1948 by the whites-only Nationalist Party 
of South Africa, when they won the whites-only general election. The 
Party’s policy was outspokenly segregationist, flying in the face of 
Harold Macmillan’s now famous “winds of change in Africa” speech. 
Race as a marker of human worth, life chances, and political power 
(as was the norm) was not neutered in the wake of the Second World 
War. Instead, it was reinvigorated via the institution of further legal 
entrenchment.
On November 30, 1973, the General Assembly of the United Nations 
adopted Resolution 3068. It was the culmination of a series of expres-
sions of censure declaring the system of apartheid in South Africa to be 
a crime against humanity and a violation of the United Nations Charter. 
For the white minority regime, it was no longer possible to use euphe-
misms to obfuscate the highly reified and inhuman racial ordering of 
South African society. It had to confront the fact that the economic and 
social costs of sustaining its racial ordering policies had escalated enor-
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mously. (It should be noted that South Africa’s main trading partners 
were in Europe.)
Act No. 200 of 1993, the Interim Constitution of South Africa, for-
mally ended the racial ordering that was the essential characteristic 
of the apartheid state. This Constitution was the product of a series of 
formal agreements reached between the two primary parties involved 
in the struggle for South Africa. It was the upshot of extensive nego-
tiations that had been going on since 1990, primarily between the 
National Party-led whites-only minority regime and the non-racial 
African National Congress (ANC). This Act led directly to the creation 
of the South African TRC via The Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act, No. 34, of 1995.
There was no clear victor or vanquished group by 1990 in South 
Africa. At the end of the previous decade, it was becoming obvious to 
significant parts of the ruling white minority regime that it was unable 
to continue to suppress the mass opposition to its existence. At best, it 
was able to coercively maintain an unstable and very costly equilib-
rium in South Africa. In addition, international economic boycott pres-
sures were wreaking havoc with the South African economy and the 
mainly whites-only business classes were fast losing interest in main-
taining the more and more counterproductive racial order that had 
served them so well in the past. On the other hand, it was equally clear 
to the opposition liberation forces that they were going to be unable 
to seize power from below or militarily in the foreseeable future. The 
logic of this stalemate had a much stronger impact than was recog-
nized at the time.
F. The South African Small Miracle: A Compromise
The essentials of the South African compromise are well known. Colin 
Bundy, the eminent South African revisionist historian, captures its core 
element as follows: “the ANC first sought the political kingdom” and 
the National Party succeeded in getting the former to back off “from 
redistribution and state regulation” of the economy.42 In so doing, the 
ongoing low-level civil war was ultimately contained and the exist-
ing infrastructure and economy survived largely intact—together with 
its deeply unequal distribution of wealth. A trade-off had been made 
between the two main parties, with international corporate capital 
playing the midwife.43
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The Kempton Park negotiations went on for four years. They 
included an agreement on a series of sunset clauses that were incor-
porated into the Interim Constitution. These clauses committed the 
first post-1994 election democratic government to power sharing and 
secured the jobs of white civil servants for five years. The Parties also 
agreed in principle to indemnify soldiers, security agents, and politi-
cians from civil or criminal prosecution in return for revealing their 
past actions and crimes. In other words, it was agreed that a form of 
individual amnesty be made available that coincided with the char-
acter of the negotiated and traded transition that was being made 
overall. The ANC refused to countenance the NP demand for a blanket 
amnesty.
This would be an incomplete account if one were to situate these 
events and their outcomes purely in objective structural terms. There 
were some remarkable individual personalities involved. Much has 
been written about the bearing that the social bonding among the 
key political negotiators had in the final outcome. The history of, and 
no doubt the ultimately determining nature of social relationships, in 
South Africa were characterized by increasingly deep racial cleavages, 
growing economic power imbalance, and the exploitation and brutal-
ization of black people by white people over time. However, even as 
the relationships between prison warder and prisoner seem to create 
bonds of a sort, there existed in South Africa some covert social fabric, 
some knowledge about one another, that somehow enabled the Kemp-
ton Park elites to work with one another at times.44 In this regard, two 
very influential forces significantly impacted the negotiated transi-
tional processes. First, South Africa had not had a full-scale, long-term 
bloody civil war raging between the main protagonists. In the second 
place, an important segment of the liberation movement leadership 
had been in exile from South Africa or in jail on Robben Island for a 
prolonged period of time.
Any reading of the unfolding of this negotiated democracy will 
show that while there were many crises and many moments when seri-
ous breakdown occurred, Kempton Park somehow held together and a 
realization of the structural interdependence between black and white 
in South Africa seemed to grow. Nelson Mandela’s role in all of this 
should not be overly glorified. Yet it would be extremely short-sighted 
not to acknowledge that it was his enormously gifted leadership ability 
and great humanity that provided the glue that held the many factions 
of the liberation movement as well as those of the overwhelmingly 
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white negotiators together at crucial moments. Further, and in ret-
rospect, it was his understanding of, and approach to, legitimating a 
negotiated transition and translating it that captured the commitment 
to reconciliation and nation building that was to be the driving force 
of post-1994 democratic South Africa. This became the leitmotif of his 
historic five-year Presidency. There is little doubt that F.W. de Klerk 
did not fully understand the consequences of what he was doing on 
“Red Friday” of February 1990, when he announced the “unbanning” 
of the liberation movements and the freeing of political prisoners. It 
is to his credit and that of the think tanks around him, nevertheless, 
that he stayed with the negotiation process and accepted its outcomes, 
thereby lending inestimable legitimacy to the South African transition 
to democracy in its initial years.
G. Truth Commissioning’s Moment had Come
Truth commissioning as a mode of promoting transitional justice and 
democracy in post-repressive and conflict-ridden societies had gained 
considerable stature and exposure over the fifteen to twenty years pre-
ceding the establishment of the South African Commission. “Forward-
looking justice,” as Jon Elster would have it, was an agenda item on 
the international stage. It had been used repeatedly in South America 
and elsewhere in Africa, and seemed to have achieved some successes, 
especially in the former. At least fifteen truth commissions had been 
established by the mid-1990s. There were also a range of actors who 
had taken an interest in this form of closing the books and the questions 
of accountability that arose with it in South Africa. They included the 
ANC’s Kader Asmal45 as well as the Institute for a Democratic South 
African (IDASA). The latter was a respected and well-known NGO 
think tank in South Africa, led by Alex Boraine, who was to become the 
vice-chairperson of the SATRC.
The Cold War in Europe had only just ended by early 1990. Interna-
tional political arrangements, relations, and alignments were in a pro-
cess of large-scale flux and transition. This meant at least two things 
for Southern Africa. The apartheid state’s long fear of the communist 
threat subsided considerably and the liberation movements, especially 
the ANC, lost the support and patronage it had received over many 
years from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
In 1994, South Africa held its first-ever democratic election, and 
political power was transferred to the majority. The ANC gained over 
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60% of the popular vote. Under the presidency of Nelson Mandela, 
they set about constructing a power-sharing government (or govern-
ment of national unity). On the agenda was the matter of building 
a viable democracy, together with the promotion of reconciliation, 
national unity, security, and amnesty, as captured by the 1993 Interim 
Constitution. The Kempton Park settlement provided a powerful and 
legitimate platform for the trade-offs dealing with South Africa’s con-
flict-ridden, authoritarian, and oppressive racialized past, framed by 
truth commissioning as a method of transitional justice.
H. The SATRC: Matters of Organization and Function
Before looking at the structures and functions of the commission in 
a bit more detail, let us summarize its formal task. The SATRC was 
specifically mandated to engage, investigate, and document the gross 
human rights violations that took place in South Africa from 1960 to 
1994. It was to compile as complete a picture as possible of them. In 
so doing, the SATRC was obligated to look at the reasons for, and the 
antecedents of, these events. Hypothetically, this process of finding the 
truth so as to promote justice and forward-looking reconciliation was 
meant to do the following:
•  provide a description of, and explanation for, the gross human rights 
violations that took place
•  serve as a basis from which to launch and facilitate the amnesty pro-
cess
•  serve as a starting point for setting up a reparations policy
•  promote truth telling, reconciliation, and national unity (revealing is 
healing)
The Postamble “compromise” to the 1993 Interim Constitution cap-
tured two important codes. Amnesty would be granted to individual 
applicants46 in return for the full and truthful revelation of “omissions 
and offences associated with political objectives and committed in the 
context of the conflicts of the past.” Secondly, justice would be sought 
in South Africa in line with the political compromise that had been 
reached.
In essence, The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 
of 1995 asserted that reconciliation between the South African people 
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was possible through truth telling and truth gathering. This position 
contained a further matrix of assumptions:
•  such a process would reveal the details of the truth about the apart-
heid state’s repression of, and atrocities against, the great majority 
of its population on the basis of their skin colour;
•  the truth of the past events would be found and acknowledged 
through this course of action and that this was a form of transitional 
justice;
•  the commission rested on the notion that revealing is healing, built on 
the theory that a decent society in South Africa could be established 
and made human even in the face of the atrocities of the past;
•  if this were to occur, victims would be able to forgive their pain and 
suffering, even if they could not forget;
•  perpetrators, even though they were not required to show remorse 
or ask for forgiveness, would commit themselves to never allowing 
a recurrence of such atrocities;
•  the bulk of white South Africans would be forced to face the past 
and, as a result, the continued denial of it would be eradicated;
•  this theory of truth would lead to reconciliation, and that national 
unity would come about as a result;
•  the space for a viable and enduring peace would be established so 
that the democratic reconstruction of the country could take place;
•  the victims would be able to gain relief and closure; and
•  the knowledge of the details of atrocities committed against them 
would compensate victims for the (retributive) justice that they 
would forgo, in that it would alleviate their pain.
In summary, the South African TRC was mandated to accomplish 
a wide range of complex and gruelling tasks including finding the 
truth about the past through a process of victim-centered narrative 
and storytelling; formally acknowledging past abuses; promoting rec-
onciliation; providing the perpetrators with the opportunity to obtain 
amnesty; providing victims with the opportunity and tools to heal; 
preventing the atrocities of the past from being repeated; and provid-
ing the state with a policy document for a program of reparations and 
in so doing, promoting reconciliation, security, national unity, and sus-
tainable democracy.
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Overall, The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 
No. 34 of 1995 is a document broad in both scope and principle. It is 
also an idealistic piece of visioning. In spirit, the Act captures a prom-
ise and a hope that the future will enable the ultimate humanity of 
people to overcome the past.
The South African Commission “dwarfed previous truth commis-
sions in its size and reach.”47 Organizationally, it operated with three 
committees and via four regional offices.48 The Human Rights Viola-
tions Committee had the duty of collecting statements from victims 
and deponents reporting on gross human rights violations, hold-
ing public hearings, and making victim findings after carrying out a 
form of low-level corroboration (the legal measure being the balance 
of probabilities). The Amnesty Committee received and processed 
amnesty applications from individuals, either in a public hearing or 
in committee, depending upon the form and subject of the applica-
tion. The Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee was tasked with 
identifying individuals who came to the commission to tell their sto-
ries and who were in need of urgent interim relief, as well as making 
recommendations to government through parliament for a policy on 
reparations. This committee had no chequebook and was conceived of 
both as a support committee for the victims and an advisory body to 
the commission and parliament. This structure had never been used in 
truth commissioning before. It made the South African body the most 
ambitious commission ever to be established at that time. It was also 
the first commission that had the power to grant amnesty.
There were seventeen commissioners. The South African Nobel 
Peace Prize laureate, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, was appointed as 
chairperson. President Mandela made the appointments from a list 
he was given after a public nomination and selection process. In other 
words, a fair degree of transparency was built into the process of 
appointing commissioners. Some attention was also paid to diversify-
ing the panel of commissioners. For example, a member of the white 
right wing, who had been a sitting member of the apartheid parlia-
ment, was appointed to the Amnesty Committee. Around 300 persons 
worked for the commission in its four regional offices over the first 
two, and key, information-gathering years of its life. (The commission 
was only meant to exist for a maximum of two years.) On the whole, 
these people came from the ranks of civil society organizations that 
had opposed the apartheid government. The commission appointed a 
relatively small team of investigators to help with the corroboration of 
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amnesty applications and in making victim findings. People from the 
range of different security forces were appointed to this team, includ-
ing a number of former and then-serving members of the South Afri-
can police force.
The Human Rights Violations Committee collected about 20,000 
statements, while the Amnesty Committee received around 7,000 
applications for amnesty. A relatively small percentage of the latter 
applications came from people who were members of the apartheid 
state’s security forces; that is, those who had served in the South Afri-
can police force rather than the Defence Force.
The Human Rights Violations Committee held public hearings 
that were shown on television and broadcast on radio. While a small 
number of public hearings were to act as windows into the SATRC, 
these hearings seemed to take on a life of their own, once the first 
two had been held (in the Eastern Cape and Johannesburg). The tele-
vised human-rights atrocities public hearings went on to dominate, to 
the exclusion of almost everything else, the organizational life of the 
commission during the two-year period it had to complete its work. 
In the end, the formal period of the commission’s work lasted from 
December 1995 to March 2003, a totally unanticipated seven years and 
three months. In terms of the founding act, Act No. 34, the TRC’s orga-
nizational life was meant to span 18 months, with the possibility of 
a further six-month extension in the event that more time should be 
required. The Human Rights Violations Committee also held a series 
of so-called special hearings over the period of the first two years. 
These focused on a number of key sectors, such as business, the media, 
and the health sector. They were an attempt to engage these sectors 
with a view to considering their response to, or participation in, the 
events of the past.
The Amnesty Committee’s work was very slow to get off the ground. 
In fact, it did most of its work after the first two years of the commis-
sion’s information-gathering organizational life. Applicants applied 
to the committee as individuals. They were not required to ask for 
forgiveness or to show any sign of remorse. Decisions by the commit-
tee were meant to be made in terms of a number of factors: whether 
the act was politically motivated; whether there was proportionality 
between the act and the political objective pursued by the applicant; 
and whether the full truth of the action was revealed. A small number 
of these hearings were also televised. They were all open to the public.
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There is significant evidence to support the argument that, overall, 
a fair degree of openness and transparency characterized the com-
mission’s work. The commission attempted to build an organizational 
structure that included representation as broad as possible of the diver-
sity of South African political opinion and people. It did, in fact, suc-
ceed in doing significant and worthwhile work.
V. Strengths and Weaknesses: The SATRC
A. Weaknesses
The enormous potency of symbolic power in the mass media should 
not be confused with wholesale healing, or large-scale societal repen-
tance, or national reconciliation. The latter was not achieved in South 
Africa and is unlikely to be easily achieved, no matter the context or 
the country in which truth commissioning is carried out.
In the case of South Africa, the basic material needs of all have 
not (yet) been adequately met. Extensive and structural socioeconomic 
inequality and poverty are neither easily nor quickly remedied in any 
society, despite the promises of politicians to the contrary. It takes time 
and courage to deal with material questions. After authoritarian and 
conflict-ridden societies commit themselves to democratic arrange-
ments, the demand for palpable and visible material change to the 
benefit of all is always massive. In South Africa, around 30% of people 
are unemployed in 2006, as they were ten years ago, at the height of the 
Commission’s work. The great majority of them are black, as they have 
been throughout post-colonial history. In this stark context, national 
reconciliation can ultimately be a barren notion, generally speaking.
Secondly, little new truth was told or ‘discovered’ by the South Afri-
can TRC. No new or pluralist interpretation of South African history 
emerged from the Commission’s work. On the whole, “truth” remains 
divided and differentiated. The facts of the apartheid regime’s atroci-
ties were, and are, on the whole, well known and documented. After 
all, the press had remained relatively free throughout the years of 
struggle, South Africa enjoyed a vigorous and progressive civil society, 
and there existed an active, critical, and prolific body of researchers 
at the country’s universities who were not silenced. A reading of the 
commission’s 1998 five-volume “Final Report” shows quite clearly that 
the historical explanations it presents do not provide us with a new 
understanding of South Africa’s past. Rather, it draws upon and from 
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the large body of existing work. Whilst some individual victims and/or 
their families and friends learned the details of why, when, and where, 
most people, unfortunately, did not.
In point of fact, few perpetrators came to the SATRC and even fewer 
“confessed.”49 Generally speaking, those that did appear came because 
evidence against them had been collected by the authorities before the 
advent of the Commission, and prosecution was probable after the 
Commission’s window of opportunity closed. Moreover, the inves-
tigative and research capacity of the SATRC was limited, relatively 
speaking. It should be remembered that it was not meant to be a pros-
ecutorial body. As is the nature of truth commissioning, legal justice 
was traded for restorative or forward-looking justice. The rule of law 
was not applied to deal with the atrocities and crimes of the apart-
heid regime or its agents. The question of accountability remains open 
insofar as a punishment to fit the crime was not sought by the SATRC. 
The TRC Act, however, held out the promise that prosecution would 
and could follow the work of the Commission for those who had not 
applied to it. The South African state has recently announced that it 
will prosecute some individuals who did not come to the Commission 
when existing evidence warrants it, although there is still much debate 
within the ruling party as to its value.
Finally, it was assumed that in the context of the South African small 
miracle it would be possible to bring about a paradigm shift at the level 
of the collective consciousness of the people, and that truth would 
heal when it came to dealing with the atrocities of the past regime. 
However, reconciliation and national unity are both complex and illu-
sive phenomena. Few perpetrators who qualified for amnesty actu-
ally came to the Commission. One of the most telling refrains of the 
work in the TRC became the question asked so often by black South 
Africans: “Where are the white people?” Whites did not come in any 
numbers either to listen, to learn, to say they were sorry, or even just to 
talk about the past.
B. Strengths
Notwithstanding the range of real weaknesses and problems, the 
choice for and process of closing of the books in South Africa’s search 
for security, national unity, and sustainable democracy (that is, truth 
commissioning) has brought with it a number of significant and worth-
while benefits.
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There is little doubt that the Commission served one overall and 
exceedingly important function at a very crucial moment in South Afri-
ca’s modern history. Soon after the negotiated democratic dispensation 
was implemented in 1994, there followed a period when the great mass 
of ordinary South Africans, both black and white, needed desperately 
to be held, sociologically and emotionally. Over this time, the ideals of 
truth commissioning served a majority of South Africans, although not 
all of them all of the time, and not all in the same way. The basis upon 
which to rebuild key institutions was created during the Kempton Park 
negotiations. The work of the TRC was to give South Africans time and 
space to consider what their respective leaderships had done at Kemp-
ton Park and to ponder the notion of a “rainbow” nation and if a viable 
democracy was possible to move South Africa forward. Together with 
the person and Presidency of Nelson Mandela and under the chairper-
sonship of Desmond Tutu, the SATRC provided a time for “holding” 
when it was desperately needed.
Paradoxically, the accounts of violence and abuse, of the terrible 
brutalization primarily of the disenfranchised black people, and of 
the public exposure of the dynamics and processes of stripping away 
collective and individual dignity ultimately brought with them the 
promise of a better life. This promise and the hope it engendered 
were embedded in the enormously powerful emotional discourse that 
played itself out in the public media. It symbolized a long-withheld 
rite of passage to citizenship in the lives of black South Africans.
The great majority of South Africans were for the first time in their 
lives affirmed. They were accorded full citizenship rights both in con-
crete terms and symbolically. The past was acknowledged primarily 
via the legitimacy that was gained by the public and cumulative telling 
of individual stories. It became clear that the past had in fact happened, 
and moreover that it was wrong. Black South Africans who were crimi-
nalized at birth by the color of their skin were freed. Their trauma at 
having lived in a society that did not structurally or legally recognize 
their humanity was acknowledged. The role that ongoing live televi-
sion broadcasts played over a period of about fifteen months (mainly 
the HRV Committee’s public hearings of victims and deponents telling 
stories of atrocities) cannot be overestimated.
The beneficiaries of the apartheid regime, who were for the most 
part in denial about the harsh and repressive reality of life for black 
South Africans and who saw the systematic atrocities of the past as 
exceptions or occasional mistakes, were left with little behind which to 
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hide. Some began to wonder how they had let it happen. Considerably 
fewer continued to argue that it hadn’t happened. Hannah Arendt’s 
notion of the “terrifying normality of the people” who committed the 
Holocaust—who were part of both letting it happen as well as commit-
ting the atrocities—came alive in South Africa over this time, revealing, 
for those who wanted to see, the very powerful lessons of lest we forget. 
The SATRC was not only evidence of formal state acknowledgment of 
the atrocities of the apartheid regime. It also brought that acknowledg-
ment into the broad public South African domain, and that should not 
be underestimated.
VI. Conclusion
It is too soon to tell how South Africans or South Africa will view the 
Commission or how it will be taken up into collective memory over 
time. Clearly, the many over-idealized and overly ambitious hopes and 
expectations for the SATRC overburdened it. In retrospect, it could not 
hope to have done what was required of it by its founding legislation 
or what was expected of it by the people of South Africa. The iconic 
international status accorded the acts of contrition by a small number 
of perpetrators should not be seen to be more than they were—or less 
than they were. They were significant and important events that will 
stand as examples of what is humanly possible. Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu is a truly special and great person. This does not mean, however, 
that the SATRC was able to transform South Africa in his image. Nor 
does it detract from the enormously important role he played and 
continues to play in trying to remake and secure South Africa. The 
mythmaking that seems to be characteristic of the international view 
of the South African Commission’s work does not serve the transitional 
justice truth commissioning project well, or for that matter, the build-
ing of sustainable democracy in post-conflict authoritarian societies.
Instead, and on the basis of the evidence of the South African Com-
mission, sober and serious consideration is needed if this tool of transi-
tional justice is to play a role as more than a very necessary, even vital, 
but short-term mode of dealing with closing the books on the crimes of 
the past. If one lesson is to be learned from the South African expe-
rience, it is “that the expectations for truth commissions are almost 
always greater than what these bodies can ever reasonably hope to 
achieve.”50 In consequence, they need to be resolutely reviewed so as 
to find more viable and realistic ways of holding on to the possible lon-
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ger-term societal benefits of forward-looking truth commissioning and 
its role in promoting societal transition to democracy. This is the main 
lesson a fledgling Somalia can learn from the South African case.
Notes
1. This paper benefited significantly from Maxi Schoeman’s reading. We would like to 
thank her for her suggestions and additions. Of course, we are solely responsible for the 
errors that may remain, both in terms of conceptualization and fact.
2. See, for example, Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri (2003/04) for a useful discussion 
about the argument of institutions as the basis of stable democracy.
3. Jon Elster 2004, p. ix.
4. At the time of the appointment of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission in December of 1995, at least 15 truth commissions had been set up (Priscilla B. 
Hayner, 1994). By 2002, there were or had been 25 of these bodies, according to Hayner 
(2002). Since then, truth commissioning as a strategy has become even more evident in 
attempts to build peace and democracy in the wake of civil war, societal conflict, and 
authoritarian regimes. The latest commission established in Africa is in Burundi. It was 
set up as a result of the United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1606, of June 
2005. The resolution stipulated the setting up of a mixed truth commission and a special 
court to prosecute war crimes and the human-rights violations during the decades of 
civil war in Burundi.
5. The setting up of the International Criminal Court that followed the Rome Statutes of 
1998 is a key development in support of this position.
6. Janis Grobbelaar occupied an insider status in the South African Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission for the key period of its evidence-gathering and statement-tak-
ing working life. She acted as (what was designated in the organizational chart of the 
SATRC) an information manager in the Johannesburg regional office from April 1996 to 
January of 1998. In everyday life, she is a professional academic sociologist. This article 
needs to be read in this light. Insider status and dynamics bring both strengths and 
weaknesses.
7. See Priscilla Hayner 2002, pp. 154–169, and Jeremy Sarkin 2004, pp. 211–227, for 
insightful and useful discussion of the problems around various conceptualisations and 
theories of reconciliation.
8. The SATRC consisted of three Committees: a Human Rights Violations Committee, 
an Amnesty Committee, and a Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee. Each of the 
committees functioned “independently.” The latter proved to be a serious organizational 
problem. The only opportunity for “integrated” discussion of the work being done by 
each was full commission meetings.
9. We are not suggesting that national, collective, societal, or political reconciliation are 
necessarily synonyms, but that for our purposes they share enough common ground to 
be grouped as one category.
10. Sarkin 2004, p. 226.
11. Ibid., p. 219.
12. Personal experience. Janis Grobbelaar was present at the discussion in 1996.
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13. Bill McSweeney 1999, p. 156.
14. Buzan 1991.
15. McSweeney 1999, p. 156.
16. See Simpson 2004 and Van der Spuy 2004.
17. This is not to imply that there was no violence during this period. On the contrary, 
see Mattes 1994. Yet the principle did provide a measure of confidence for a range of 
political actors. In violence-torn KwaZulu-Natal, strong political leadership from the top 
assisted in preventing the violence from turning into full-blown civil war, and contained 
it largely within the confines of the province.
18. Kaminski, Nalepa, and O’Neill 2006, p. 295.
19. Teitel 2002, p. 70.
20. Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective, 2004.
21. Ibid., p. ix.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 3.
24. Ibid., pp. 3–23.
25. It should be noted that Elster is at pains to make sure that the reader is under no illu-
sion as to the great many dissimilarities in context, process, and solution, depending on 
the empirical case in question. He also makes it clear that he is not trying to suggest that 
one model fits all.
26. Ibid., p. 21.
27. Ibid., p. 22.
28. Ahmed I. Samatar 2006, pp. 101–114.
29. In this paper, Samatar divides Somali history into three periods: that of the pre-colo-
nial order, the colonial order, and the postcolonial state.
30. Ibid., pp. 116–122.
31. Ibid., pp. 47–76.
32. See the Final Report, Volume 6 (2003).
33. See, for example, Adam and Adam in James and Van De Vijver 2000; and John Elster 
2004.
34. Priscilla Hayner 2002, p. 86.
35. Minow 2000, p. 236.
36. Robert Rotberg, Truth and Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, 2000.
37. Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions, 2002.
38. Ibid., p. 5.
39. Ibid., p. 213.
40. Bruce Baker 2003, p. 141.
41. See Elphick 1977 for the best analysis of the making of race in South Africa over the 
period of the initial colonization of the Cape from 1652.
42. Bundy in James and Van De Vijver 2000, p. 12.
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43. See, for example, Terreblanche 2002; Adam, Slabbert, and Moodley 1997; James and 
Lever 2001; Alexander 2002; and Bozzoli 2004 for good discussions on various aspects of 
post-apartheid analyses of South Africa.
44. See Ndebele 2000 and Bundy 2000 on some of the reasoning and the trading that 
underpinned the establishment of SATRC.
45. Kader Asmal had been a Professor of Law at Trinity College in Dublin while exiled 
in Ireland for 27 years. He became a Cabinet Minister in Nelson Mandela’s first govern-
ment. He was also a Cabinet Minister in Thabo Mbeki’s first term of office as President 
of South Africa.
46. While entrenched racial ordering was the defining character of apartheid, determin-
ing both the lifestyle and the life chances of all South Africans, the Interim Constitution 
formally turned this around. It systematically set out to reconstruct South Africa as a 
non-racial, non-sexist, and non-discriminatory society. According to its stipulations, in 
post-apartheid South Africa, people’s lives would not be determined structurally, in 
terms of legally defined group membership, but as individuals and full citizens.
47. Hayner 2002, p. 41.
48. The Cape Town office consisted of both a regional and the national office. The other 
three regional offices were in Johannesburg, Durban, and East London. A small satel-
lite office existed in Bloemfontein. The latter fell under the management of the Durban 
office.
49. According to Sarkin 2005, pp. 105–127, while 7,116 people applied for amnesty, the 
majority (around 4,500) had been convicted of ordinary or common law offences and 
thus sought amnesty while incarcerated for offences with no political objective. Only 
about 2,500 people applied for amnesty who had committed a political offence. Overall, 
1,167 people were granted amnesty for the offences for which they applied. In 145 cases, 
partial amnesty was given.
50. Hayner 2002, p. 8.
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